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MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND THE
(IL)LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE MEDICAL
PROFESSION IN TORT REFORM
Mark Geistfeld*
INTRODUCTION
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has prompted the Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA) to lobby, once again, for a cap on
non-economic tort damages in malpractice claims.' Because the pro-
posed reform would significantly limit the liability exposure of medi-
cal professionals, the AMA's lobbying effort appears to be little more
than self-interested behavior by a professional organization. That
conclusion, however, requires thorough analysis rather than superfi-
cial observation. Moreover, regardless of the merits of a damages cap,
analyzing the type of reforms that can be supported by the legitimate
interests of physicians should enhance the process of tort reform.
Malpractice insurance does give the medical profession a legitimate
interest in tort reform, although the types of reforms that can be justi-
fied on this basis differ from those that have been favored by the
AMA. At present, malpractice insurance may be priced in an in-
defensible manner by giving physicians an incentive to move from
high-risk specialties and geographic locations. This dislocation is so-
cially costly due to the way in which it reduces patient access to care, a
social cost touted by the AMA as the reason for tort reform.2 Some
of the physicians who leave a specialty, though, will be part-time prac-
titioners who typically are unable to provide the same quality of care
as full-time practitioners. Whether this benefit offsets the cost of re-
duced access to care is an open question. But if the cost of access
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. For their very
helpful comments, I am grateful to Jennifer Arlen, Tom Baker, David Hyman, Michelle Mello,
and William Sage.
1. See, e.g., Peter Eisler et al., Special Report: Hype Outraces Facts in Malpractice Debate,
USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2003, at 1A. The American Medical Association (AMA) has previously
lobbied for a damages cap. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
2. According to the AMA, "America's patients are losing access to care because the nation's
out-of-control legal system is forcing physicians in some areas of the country to retire early,
relocate or give up performing high-risk medical procedures .... That is why medical liability
reform is the AMA's top legislative priority." AMA, America's Liability Crisis: A National
View, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/118 7 1.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2005).
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looms as large as the AMA claims, then malpractice insurance is prob-
ably priced in a socially detrimental manner and the AMA would
have legitimate grounds for complaining about malpractice premiums.
The type of tort reforms that would make malpractice insurance more
fair, however, do not involve damages caps, contrary to the AMA's
lobbying position.
Part II of this Article defines the appropriate baseline for consider-
ing the relation between malpractice insurance and the legitimate in-
terests of the medical profession in tort reform and then finds that the
general level of malpractice premiums does not create any unfairness
for the profession. The available data show that the tort system is not
generating total liability costs in excess of the total cost of malpractice
injuries-the outcome required in order for the general level of mal-
practice premiums to be unfairly high.
Although the general level of premiums is fair, Part III shows why
many physicians may nevertheless pay unfairly high premiums. For
any given policy limit, malpractice premiums typically depend only on
the physician's medical specialty and geographic location within the
state. Premiums are priced in a manner that gives physicians an incen-
tive to avoid high-risk specialties and certain geographic locations in
order to reduce their premiums. The relocation of physicians across
specialties and geographic locales quite plausibly works to the net det-
riment of patient interests. In that event, the pricing of malpractice
insurance violates the relevant legal, moral, and social criteria, creat-
ing unfairness for those physicians who must pay higher premiums
only because of their specialty or geographic location.
Part IV discusses the obstacles to fairer malpractice premiums. The
unfairness problem could be completely solved by insurance regula-
tion, making tort reform unnecessary. Alternatively, malpractice pre-
miums would be substantially fairer if based upon the policyholder's
malpractice experience. A significant obstacle to the "experience rat-
ing" of medical malpractice involves the inherent uncertainty regard-
ing the reliability of malpractice determinations, a problem that can
justify tort reform.
Part V then evaluates various tort reforms in terms of their poten-
tial to promote fairer malpractice premiums. A damages cap does not
facilitate experience rating or otherwise make malpractice premiums
more fair. Other reforms would produce a better distribution of mal-
practice costs, most notably enterprise liability. Nevertheless, the
AMA has previously resisted such a reform.3 Thus, the medical pro-
3. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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fession's interest in fair malpractice premiums justifies an approach to
tort reform that differs markedly from that favored by the AMA.
II. THE GENERAL LEVEL OF MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS
Nearly all physicians purchase malpractice insurance.4 Excessive
malpractice liability therefore could result in medical professionals
paying an unfairly high general level of malpractice premiums,
thereby potentially necessitating tort reform.
Determining whether malpractice premiums are "too high" requires
comparison to the relevant baseline by answering the following ques-
tions: What is the fair amount of liability that should be incurred by
medical professionals? Further, how do current premiums compare to
that baseline?
To understand the criteria for evaluating the fair amount of tort lia-
bility, it is useful to consider tort rules outside of the medical malprac-
tice context, such as those governing risky interactions between
drivers and pedestrians. An automobile driver typically desires trans-
portation to pursue various economic and other liberty interests. As
an unwanted byproduct of that activity, the driver exposes pedestrians
to a risk of physical injury. A pedestrian also transports herself in
furtherance of her liberty interests.
In the event of a crash that physically injures the pedestrian, by def-
inition the pedestrian's interest in physical security has been harmed.
The pedestrian also suffers emotional harms (e.g., pain and suffering)
and intangible economic harms (e.g., medical expenses). If the driver
were obligated to compensate those harms, the monetary damages
would be detrimental to his economic interests. Any precautionary
obligations that tort law imposes on the driver, such as a duty to drive
slowly, would also be detrimental to his liberty interests. Similarly,
any precautionary obligations that tort law imposes on the pedestrian
(e.g., no jaywalking) would restrict her liberty. Therefore, the way in
which tort law regulates the risky driver-pedestrian interaction means
that at least one party's interests will be burdened: either the pedes-
trian's interests in liberty and physical security; the driver's liberty in-
terests, including the economic interest; or the interests of both
parties. How these conflicting interests should be mediated is the ba-
sic question of fairness that must be addressed by tort law.
5
4. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evi-
dence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002).
5. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 144 (1881) (concluding that tort
law "is intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they fall, and the reasonable
freedom of others with the protection of the individual from injury").
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The fair mediation of interests poses a vexing question in the driver-
pedestrian context. Should tort rules prioritize the security interest in
order to protect the pedestrian's right to physical security? Or should
tort rules instead compare costs and benefits in order to maximize
social welfare and wealth? These difficult questions are not ordinarily
posed by tort rules governing medical malpractice, making it easy to
identify the principle of fairness relevant to the formulation of these
liability rules.
The fairness question in the driver-pedestrian context involves an
interpersonal conflict of liberty and security interests. The driver's ex-
ercise of freedom threatens physical injury to the pedestrian. The in-
terpersonal conflict of interests does not arise in most malpractice
cases. Like the driver, the physician is the potential injurer creating
the risk of physical injury to which the potential victim (patient) is
exposed. The similarities between the driver and physician end there.
Any tort burdens incurred by the physician-the cost of health care
and injury compensation-can be passed on to the patient in the form
of higher prices. In malpractice cases, any conflict between economic
and safety interests is internal to the patient. Malpractice liability
rules that provide for the best protection of patient interests therefore
fairly mediate the interests of concern to tort law. 6
In principle, the liability standard for medical malpractice is formu-
lated in these terms. Each physician has an ethical duty of absolute
fidelity to the patient. 7 This ethical duty should translate into medical
custom that provides for the best protection of patient interests. Med-
ical custom in the relevant community also defines the standard of
care for medical professionals. 8 By providing health care that violates
the standard of care, a medical professional presumably has not acted
in the best interests of the patient, justifying the imposition of mal-
practice liability for injuries caused by the substandard care.
The full cost of injuries caused by malpractice accordingly deter-
mines the fair amount of tort liability. Consequently, if total malprac-
tice liability exceeds the total cost of malpractice injuries, the general
6. See generally Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91
GEO. L.J. 585 (2003) (describing the importance of interest analysis in tort law and showing how
the important tort doctrines can be derived from an interpersonal priority of the security interest
over other interests); Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That
Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001) (showing why a principle of
fairness that prioritizes the security interest is compatible with cost-benefit analysis in contrac-
tual settings like products liability and medical malpractice).
7. See, e.g., TROYEN BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING: MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE LIBERAL STATE
35 (1991).
8. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 242, at 631-34 (2000).
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level of malpractice premiums would be unfairly high. Otherwise,
there is no ground for concluding that the tort system generates exces-
sive liability and an unfairly high general level of malpractice premi-
ums for medical professionals.
The relevant empirical studies clearly show that total malpractice
liability is significantly less than the total cost of malpractice injuries.
The first study covered the hospital records of approximately 20,000
patients in California in the mid-1970s, finding one tort payment for
every ten potential tort claims. 9 The Harvard Medical Practice Study
subsequently studied 30,195 records of patient stays in fifty-one New
York hospitals in 1984, finding only one tort payment for every three
potential tort claims involving the most serious or costly injuries.' 0
With respect to all negligently caused injuries, the study found an esti-
mated one tort claim for every 7.6 negligent injuries." Further, "[i]n a
third study, conducted in Utah and Colorado in the late 1990s, the
injury rates detected were similar to those in New York, and the dis-
connections observed between injury and litigation were virtually
identical, suggesting that the core problems were neither regionally
nor temporally idiosyncratic.' 2
In addition to finding fewer malpractice claims than malpractice in-
juries, empirical studies have shown that the most severely injured
malpractice claimants are undercompensated for their injuries. One
study found that "a 1 percent increase in loss yields about a 0.1 to 0.2
percent increase in compensation on average."' 3 In general, the tort
system "tends to undercompensate large losses and overcompensate
small losses."'14
The substantial gap between potential malpractice claims and paid
claims, coupled with the tendency of the tort system to undercompen-
sate large losses, implies that medical professionals are not paying for
9. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12 (1991) (summarizing Harvard
Medical Practice Study (HMPS)).
10. See id. at 13 (summarizing HMPS study with respect to "iatrogenic injuries to patients
under seventy that produced disabilities (including death) lasting six months or more").
11. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRAC-
TICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70 (1993).
12. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 285 (2004).
The study found one tort claim for every 5.1 negligent adverse events. See id.: see also David M.
Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litiga-
tion, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643, 1682
(2000).
13. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensa-
tion Fair?, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 997, 1019 (1990); see generally FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING
FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993).
14. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093. 1116
(1996) (summarizing various empirical studies).
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the full cost of malpractice injuries. The general level of malpractice
premiums is substantially lower than it would be if the tort system
functioned perfectly and if physicians were liable for all malpractice
injuries and absolved of liability in all other cases. Tort reform cannot
be plausibly justified on the ground that the general level of malprac-
tice premiums is unfairly high for the medical profession.
III. THE DETERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL
MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS
Even if the general level of premiums is fair, the amount paid by an
individual policyholder or class of policyholders can be unfair. Premi-
ums depend on the expected value of loss (probability of loss multi-
plied by severity of loss), which is determined by reference to a class
of policyholders. 15 Within each class or risk pool, the policyholders
should share similar risk characteristics. Different classifications then
reflect differences in risk, enabling insurers to charge different premi-
ums for different risk classifications. The differential in premiums can
be unfair for an individual policyholder who is treated unfairly by the
underlying risk-classification scheme.
Malpractice insurers typically define risk pools in terms of clinical
specialty and known geographic differences in claims risk. 16 Physi-
cians in high-risk specialties, such as obstetrics, pay higher premiums
than those practicing low-risk specialties, like dermatology. The pre-
mium within each specialty then depends upon the scope and fre-
quency of malpractice liability within the state or smaller regions, like
counties, for the specialty in question. The premium does not depend
upon the volume of health-care services provided by the medical pro-
fessional, nor does it depend upon the claims or malpractice experi-
ence of the individual policyholder. Malpractice premiums, in other
words, are not experience rated. A part-time obstetrician usually pays
the same malpractice premiums as a full-time obstetrician in the same
area, even if she has never been sued. Aside from the policy limits,
the premium only depends on the physician's risk characteristics per-
taining to specialty and geographic location.
This risk-classification scheme yields substantial differences in the
premiums paid by medical professionals within a state. For example,
15. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA.
L. REV. 403, 407-08 (1985).
16. For good descriptions of the risk-classification schemes commonly used by malpractice
insurers, see FRANK SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 148-50, 165-69 (1991);
Lori L. Darling, Note, The Applicability of Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice Insurance,
38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 255, 261-65 (1987).
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in 2002 "a large insurer in Florida charged base premium rates in
Dade County of $56,153 for internal medicine, $174,268 for general
surgery, and $201,376 for OB/GYN, and $34,556, $107,242 and
$123,924, respectively, for these same specialties in Palm Beach
County." 17 The substantial differences in the malpractice premiums
paid by medical professionals create a distinct possibility that the un-
derlying risk-classification scheme produces substantial unfairness.
The fairness of a risk-classification scheme can be evaluated by ref-
erence to the following five criteria, which involve the degree to which
the classifications: (1) separate risk classes on the basis of differences
in the expected value of loss; (2) depend upon risk characteristics that
are reliable and not susceptible to administrative error or fraud; (3)
have incentive value by basing the premium differential on variables
within each policyholder's control; (4) are homogenous with respect to
the amount of variation in the expected losses posed by policyholders
within each classification; and (5) depend upon socially, legally, and
morally admissible variables or risk characteristics., For each crite-
rion, the question is one of degree. No risk-classification scheme will
perfectly satisfy all five criteria.
To illustrate, consider a risk-classification scheme used by many life
insurers that requires smokers to pay higher premiums than non-
smokers, all else being equal. This classification is not commonly con-
sidered unfair for reasons that can be clarified by applying the
aforementioned criteria:
(1) The scheme adequately separates policyholders based on the
documented difference in the life expectancies of the two classes.
Smokers have a shorter life expectancy than nonsmokers, all other
risk characteristics being equal.
(2) The scheme is only partially reliable, however, insofar as smok-
ers are able to hide this characteristic from the insurer and purchase
the insurance at the lower, nonsmoker premium.
(3) The scheme has incentive value since a smoker can choose to
quit and lower her premium to the nonsmoker level.
(4) Within each classification, the degree of variation in the ex-
pected losses posed by individual policyholders would be roughly
equivalent or homogenous, except for the possibility that some
smokers will conceal this characteristic from the insurer and be mis-
takenly grouped into the nonsmoker class. As a result, the non-
smoker class has wider variation in the expected losses than the
smoker class. No unfairness arises, however, because the lack of
17. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PRE-
MIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 8 (GAO-03-836, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03836.pdf.
18. See Abraham, supra note 15, at 410-20.
2005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
homogeneity poses a problem of fairness only if the high-risk class
has greater variability than the low-risk class. 19
(5) The classification depends upon an admissible variable. There is
nothing legally, morally, or socially problematic about forcing
smokers to pay for the costs of smoking. Additionally, the higher
premium gives smokers an incentive to quit, an outcome that is not
legally, morally, or socially problematic.
We can now consider how these criteria apply to the risk-classifica-
tion scheme for malpractice insurance that defines risk pools in terms
of specialty and geographic location. These risk characteristics clearly
separate one risk pool from another. The malpractice premium de-
pends upon the risk that the insured will incur liability for malpractice
claims during the policy period. The liability risk is comprised of vari-
ous factors, including the probability that the insured will be sued for
malpractice, the probability that the insured will be required to pay
damages pursuant to a judgment or settlement, and the amount of
potential damages. These risk characteristics depend upon the medi-
cal specialty of the insured. For example, an obstetrician who com-
mits malpractice ordinarily pays greater damages than a dermatologist
who commits malpractice. The risk characteristics also depend upon
geographic location within the jurisdiction. Damages for lost wages
will be higher in some locations than others. A risk-classification
scheme based entirely on specialty and geographic location, therefore,
separates medical professionals into different groups facing different
amounts of liability risk.
The liability risk faced by an individual insured also depends upon
the quality of health care she provides. But due to the absence of
experience rating, a medical professional usually cannot control the
level of her premiums by providing quality care. Malpractice premi-
ums typically do not depend upon the malpractice experience of the
physician.
The absence of experience rating may make the risk-classification
scheme unfair for medical professionals classified in the high-risk
19. The true nonsmokers pay the same premium as the higher-risk deceitful smokers, a varia-
tion among group members absent from the smoker group. Whereas the true nonsmokers par-
tially subsidize the premiums for the deceitful smokers, the truthful smokers are not subsidizing
anyone else. The greater variability or more extensive subsidization that occurs within the group
of nonsmokers does not pose an issue of fairness, however, because the risk-classification
scheme benefits the nonsmokers by enabling the insurer to charge lower premiums for the
group. In exchange for the benefits of lower premiums, the nonsmokers must incur the subsidi-
zation costs created by the deceitful smokers. Such an exchange does not make the classification
scheme unfair. Instead, the classification might be unfair if it both increased premiums for the
individual and increased the amount of subsidization required of the individual-an outcome
possible only for those in the high-risk category.
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pools. In order for the associated malpractice premiums to be fair, the
risk-classification scheme should depend only upon risk characteristics
that are admissible in terms of the relevant legal, moral, and social
criteria. A risk-classification scheme that depends only on the in-
sured's specialty and geographic location might not satisfy these crite-
ria for reasons involving the incentive value of the scheme.
Most obviously, malpractice insurance that is not experience rated
undermines the incentive of medical professionals to avoid malprac-
tice liability. A physician who has incurred malpractice liability is not
ordinarily penalized by an increase in premiums, reducing the incen-
tive to avoid malpractice liability. Malpractice insurance lacks incen-
tive value in this respect, although the problem is not a sufficient
reason for concluding that the risk-classification scheme is unfair or
undesirable. Medical professionals have other incentives for avoiding
liability, provided by ethical obligations, professional reputation, and
the time and hassle of litigation. Moreover, virtually any form of lia-
bility insurance undermines the incentive of the policyholder to avoid
liability. That incentive effect (i.e., moral hazard) is a necessary cost
for obtaining the social value of liability insurance.
Instead, the unfairness stems from the other incentives created by a
risk-classification scheme defined solely in terms of specialty and geo-
graphic location. One scholar states, "[u]nder the competitive condi-
tions that now prevail, medical care providers rather than consumers
will often bear the lion's share of increased insurance costs." °20 The
steep increases in malpractice premiums that have been occurring will
likely have the greatest impact on the net profits of specialists like
obstetricians who pay the highest premiums, providing a significant
economic incentive for these physicians to reduce malpractice premi-
ums in order to increase profits.21 Physicians can reduce premiums by
moving from socially valuable, though risky, specialties such as obstet-
rics into less risky specialties. Any resultant shortage of obstetricians
can be detrimental to patients. Physicians can also reduce premiums
by relocating to geographic regions with a reduced scope or frequency
of malpractice liability. The concentration of medical professionals in
such areas forces patients in other areas to travel long distances for
20. William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the Medical Malpractice
Crisis, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 10, 17.
21. Malpractice premiums can account for as much as twenty percent of an obstetrician's
gross revenues. See Diane Levick, Insurers Squeeze State Doctors: Malpractice Rates Increasing
Dramatically, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 17, 2002, at Al. On average, physicians spend 3.2%
of their revenue on malpractice insurance. See Eisler et al., supra note 1.
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treatment-a significant safety concern for health problems requiring
immediate treatment. Again, obstetrics provides a good example.
Predictably, medical professionals are making these socially prob-
lematic choices as a result of their malpractice premiums: "Nation-
wide, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology reported in
2002 that 73 percent of obstetricians in the 12 states worst hit with
premium increases have either retired, relocated or limited their prac-
tices to reduce their potential liability risks. ' '22 The impact of mal-
practice premiums on the physician choice of specialty is not a new
development. During the malpractice insurance crisis of the 1980s, a
"considerable number of family physicians who serve low-income and
rural communities [were] reported to be giving up or cutting down on
obstetrics because of liability concerns." 23 Physicians have made
these decisions for myriad reasons, and it is unlikely that the supply of
physicians has been dramatically reduced by rising malpractice premi-
ums. 24 Nevertheless, malpractice premiums are influencing the deci-
sions of a number of physicians with respect to specialty and
geographic location. 25
22. Medical Malpractice Litigation Raises Health Care Costs, Reduces Access and Lowers
Quality of Care, ISSUE BACKGROUNDER (Employment Policy Found., Washington D.C.), June
19, 2003, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Medical Malpractice Litigation], available at http://www.epf.org/
pubs/newsletters/2003/ib20030619.pdf.
23. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Bad "Bad Baby" Bills, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 129, 130 n.8 (1994)
(citing INST. OF MED., 1 MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRI-
CAL CARE 42-48 (1989)).
24. See KATHERINE BAICKER & AMITABH CHANDRA, THE EFFECT OF MALPRACTICE LIABIL-
ITY ON THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10709, 2004). The influence of factors other than malpractice premiums is reflected in a U.S.
General Accounting Office report which found
instances in the five states where actions taken by physicians in response to malpractice
pressures have reduced access to services affecting emergency surgery and newborn
deliveries [that] were not concentrated in any one geographic area and often occurred
in rural locations, where maintaining an adequate number of physicians may have been
a long-standing problem.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 5.
25. See, e.g., Editorial, The Doctors Are Leaving, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 2004, at C8 ("Illinois
doctors are fleeing across the border to states such as Wisconsin, Indiana and Missouri, where
insurance costs are much lower."); Medical Malpractice Litigation, supra note 22, at 6 (citing
reports from Oregon and Washington concerning the large number of surgeons, obstetricians,
and other critical specialists "moving to neighboring California to find a lower risk climate for
their practices"). See also BAICKER & CHANDRA, supra note 24, at 17 (empirical study finding
that "[o]verall, a 10% increase in malpractice premiums results in a 1% decrease in all rural
MDs per capita, and almost a 2% decrease in older rural MDs"). Further evidence of the incen-
tive effects created by malpractice premiums are provided by studies finding that the existence
of a damages cap, which presumably reduces malpractice premiums, increases the number of
physicians in a state. See generally FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE IMPACT OF STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS (July 3, 2003), http://www.ahrq.gov/research/
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These social costs are not a necessary incident of malpractice insur-
ance. Malpractice premiums could be uniform for all medical profes-
sionals within a jurisdiction, regardless of specialty or geographic
location. As compared to the current menu of malpractice premiums,
a system of uniform premiums would increase the premiums for some
physicians while decreasing premiums for others. Each physician,
though, could still purchase malpractice insurance at the uniform pre-
mium. Physicians would still have access to malpractice insurance if
premiums were not based on specialty and geographic location, so the
social costs created by these premiums must find justification
elsewhere.
Any justification for these social costs must reside in the admissibil-
ity criterion, which evaluates the risk characteristics of specialty and
geographic location in terms of the relevant legal, moral, or social cri-
teria. As previously discussed, these criteria reduce to a principle of
fairness that requires the best protection of patient interests.26 This
group incurs the social costs that arise when physicians change special-
ties or relocate in order to reduce their malpractice premiums. Due to
this social cost, the risk-classification scheme can be justified under
the admissibility criterion only if it creates a sufficient social benefit
for medical patients.
To determine the social benefits provided by the risk-classification
scheme, first consider medical patients with health insurance. These
individuals pay a premium for health insurance that is based upon the
expected cost of medically necessary health care-an amalgam of
costs throughout various health-care specialties. The medically neces-
sary health costs incurred by insured medical patients already involve
a substantial collectivization of cost across specialties and locations,
eliminating any benefit these patients might otherwise derive from a
risk-classification scheme that makes malpractice premiums depen-
dent on an individual physician's specialty and geographic location.
The scheme merely individualizes malpractice prices for various spe-
cialties and locations, an effect that is then largely lost by the collectiv-
ization of costs inherent in the calculation of premiums for health
insurance. All else being equal, malpractice premiums based upon
tortcaps/tortcaps.pdf; Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice Reform
Help States Retain Physicians and Does It Matter? (Oct. 2, 2003) (unpublished paper), at http://
mailer.fsu.edu/-jklick[Reform9.pdf. See generally Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Re-
forms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167 (1990) (empirical
study finding that physicians in states with a damages cap have lower malpractice premiums than
physicians in states without a damages cap).
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining why the relevant principle of fairness
is framed in terms of patient interests).
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specialty and geographic location confer no apparent benefit on in-
sured medical patients.
This conclusion also applies to uninsured medical patients. Most of
these individuals would prefer to purchase health insurance in order
to reduce the risk of incurring health care expenses, but they cannot
afford to do so because of the high premiums. 27 These individuals,
therefore, would benefit from any arrangement that enables them to
reduce risk without increasing their expected cost of health care. If
malpractice premiums were not based on specialty or geographic loca-
tion, the resultant equalization of malpractice premiums across spe-
cialties and locations would effectively turn the malpractice risk for
each specialty into a collective malpractice risk borne by the group of
uninsured patients. The equalization of malpractice premiums, in
other words, would serve as a form of malpractice insurance for unin-
sured patients, which indicates that it would benefit most of them.28
Both insured and uninsured patients accordingly prefer that mal-
practice costs be collectivized across specialties and geographic loca-
tions, unless there is some offsetting benefit created by malpractice
premiums based on specialty and geographic location. The benefit
must be significant given that some patients are harmed by the way in
which these premiums induce physicians to leave high-risk specialties
and geographic areas.
The only identifiable benefit involves the reduction of physicians
who practice a specialty on a part-time basis. As some scholars con-
clude, "[t]wenty years of research have established that, for some pro-
cedures and conditions, higher volume among hospitals and physicians
27. A risk-averse individual will be willing to pay the actuarially fair premium in order to
insure fully against a monetary loss. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 192-94 (1987). An individual is risk-averse if "the party's utility increases with the level of
his wealth, [and] it does so at a decreasing rate (the interpretation being that the value to him of
having more wealth falls as he fulfills his more important needs)." Id. at 186. This characteristic
is presumably shared by most individuals, which implies that most everyone would benefit from
the provision of actuarially fair insurance.
28. In determining the preferred distribution of malpractice costs, the preference of an unin-
sured individual can be defensibly framed from an ex ante perspective that evaluates the matter
prior to the time at which the individual needs any particular health care service. Not knowing
of any particular health vulnerabilities requiring medical attention, the individual would reason-
ably evaluate expected health care costs in terms of the average characteristics within the rele-
vant population. If these same characteristics then determine the actual distribution of
malpractice costs, the expected welfare of the individual would not decrease unless she was risk-
loving. The individual would be guaranteed to experience the average outcome rather than be
forced to experience the variable outcome (with the same expected value) associated with the
payment of malpractice costs by specialty. Only risk-loving individuals would prefer the variable
outcome.
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is associated with better outcomes. ' 29 This finding suggests that the
quality of care may increase as the proportion of full-time practition-
ers within a specialty increases, a dynamic that is currently being facil-
itated by malpractice premiums. When premiums depend only on
specialty, the volume of care does not affect the premium amount. A
full-time specialist pays the same premium as a part-time specialist.
On a per patient basis, however, the malpractice insurance is signifi-
cantly less costly for the full-time specialist, giving her a competitive
advantage over part-time specialists. Malpractice premiums therefore
are predictably increasing the proportion of full-time practitioners
within a specialty, which in turn is likely to increase the quality of care
to the benefit of patients.
Malpractice premiums based upon specialty and geographic loca-
tion accordingly create incentives that are both beneficial and detri-
mental to patient interests. If the beneficial increase in the quality of
care does not offset the cost of reduced access to care, then malprac-
tice premiums would be priced in a manner that ultimately is detri-
mental to patient interests. The premiums would be based upon risk
characteristics (pertaining to specialty and geographic location) that
violate the relevant legal, normative, and social criteria and are not
admissible, implying that the risk-classification scheme unfairly treats
those medical professionals who must pay higher premiums only be-
cause of their specialty or geographic location. For this reason, physi-
cians and the AMA can justifiably complain about malpractice
insurance by relying upon the way in which malpractice insurance
reduces patient access to care.30
The problem is then compounded by the way in which the risk-clas-
sification scheme affects the spreading of risk. Dividing medical pro-
fessionals into risk classes based on specialty and geographic location
substantially reduces the number of individuals within each risk pool:
The actuarial consequence of the small size of malpractice insurance
risk pools is that insurers cannot spread among a large number of
physicians the risk that a few will be the subject of a significant
number of claims, some of which may produce extremely large ver-
dicts. Instead, a comparatively small number of physicians compris-
29. Ethan A. Haim et al., Is Volume Related to Outcome in Health Care? A Systematic Review
and Methodological Critique of the Literature, 137 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 511, 517 (2002).
30. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. It seems plausible that any beneficial impacts
on the quality of care are less than the cost of reduced access. The relationship between higher
volume and better outcomes is complicated, depending on individual procedures and conditions.
Not all procedures are subject to this effect. See Haim et al., supra note 29, at 514. Moreover,
the "relative contribution of hospital versus physician volume is largely unknown." Id. By in-
centivizing only physician volume, malpractice premiums are not necessarily promoting better
outcomes.
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ing each pool is charged with the aggregate cost of this risk ....
[Consequently], inevitable changes in the frequency or severity of
claims against a particular specialty in a particular state-changes
that might result in modest rate changes for the members of a large
risk pool-have an exaggerated effect on a small pool. The result is
that physicians practicing high-risk specialties pay malpractice pre-
miums that are many times the premiums paid by physicians prac-
ticing low-risk specialties [within] the same jurisdiction. 31
It should now be evident why malpractice insurance has drawn the
ire of the medical profession. The issue matters most to those physi-
cians facing the highest premiums, and these individuals are the ones
who may be paying unfair premiums. Someone who makes socially
valuable choices-to practice obstetrics in a poor neighborhood, for
example-is penalized (via higher premiums) for doing so. When that
person continues to make socially valuable choices regarding the pro-
vision of quality health care, the penalty (the higher premium) stays in
place due to the absence of experience rating. There is no socially
valuable choice the individual physician can make to reduce premi-
ums. In these circumstances, the malpractice premium is an under-
standable source of frustration for the physician, frustration that
predictably mounts as the premium rises.
IV. OBSTACLES TO FAIRER MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS
The unfair risk-classification scheme currently employed by mal-
practice insurers is a consequence of market competition. The classifi-
cation depends on risk characteristics that adequately separate
individuals into different risk classes in a reliable manner. Obstetri-
cians as a group incur higher average liability costs than dermatolo-
gists. The lower cost of insuring dermatologists enables insurers to
charge lower premiums to that group. If an insurer placed obstetri-
cians and dermatologists in the same risk pool, the premium for each
dermatologist would increase (to reflect the greater liability exposure
of the obstetricians within the pool). An insurer that priced premiums
in this manner would lose the business of dermatologists, as another
insurer could offer that group lower premiums by basing premiums on
specialties. Price competition accordingly forces insurers to base pre-
miums on specialties, even if such a risk characteristic is not
admissible.
This problem could be solved without tort reform. The unfairness
could be eliminated by the adoption of insurance regulations banning
31. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of
the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 401-02 (1994).
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the use of specialty and geographic location in the setting of individual
malpractice premiums. These regulations could be promulgated by in-
surance regulators in virtually every state. Insurance regulators are
almost always empowered by state law to ensure that premiums are
not "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.' '32 Thus, regu-
latory inaction poses one obstacle to fairer malpractice premiums.
A different obstacle can also be identified. A system of fair mal-
practice premiums does not necessarily require uniform premiums for
all medical professionals, regardless of specialty or geographic loca-
tion. Uniform premiums may be more equitable than the individual-
ized premiums in the current system, but individualized premiums
would become defensible if the policyholder's malpractice experience
were incorporated into the current risk-classification scheme. A phy-
sician's malpractice experience is an admissible risk characteristic, be-
cause each physician should be responsible for the quality of health
care she provides. Such responsibility is the underlying rationale for
malpractice liability, and basing premiums on this risk characteristic
would create a beneficial incentive effect. Experience rating gives
medical professionals another reason to provide quality care-to
avoid malpractice and thereby reduce premiums. These choices trans-
late into a claims experience that may then make relevant the individ-
ual's specialty and geographic location, each of which also affects the
individual's malpractice experience.33 The incorporation of experi-
ence rating into the current risk-classification scheme, therefore, is an-
other way to achieve fairer malpractice premiums. This approach,
however, faces an obstacle that may be insurmountable.
Medical malpractice insurance is not experience rated, in part, be-
cause of the weak statistical correlation between the filing of a mal-
practice lawsuit and the occurrence of malpractice. The probability
that patients who file claims were the victims of malpractice has been
estimated by four different empirical studies. The estimated
probabilities were seventeen percent, twenty-nine percent, forty-six
percent, and fifty-four percent. 34 Similarly, another study found that
the likelihood of a patient filing a malpractice claim against a physi-
32. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 97
(3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
33. The conclusion is qualified because specialty and geographic location continue to affect
premiums and therefore could create socially problematic incentives. The force of such incen-
tives depends on how claims experience otherwise affects premium levels, making it difficult to
determine whether experience rating justifies inclusion of specialty and geographic location as
additional risk characteristics.
34. See Michelle J. White, The Value of Liability in Medical Malpractice, HEALTH AFF., Fall
1994, at 75, 77.
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cian depends at least as much on her personal relationship with the
physician as on the quality of treatment. 35
The statistical correlation between the occurrence of malpractice li-
ability and the occurrence of malpractice has similar properties. Pa-
tients who have been injured by malpractice are more likely to receive
tort damages than other malpractice claimants. 36 Many claimants,
however, receive tort compensation even though independent review
shows that they were not injured by malpractice. 37 Similarly,
"[s]tudies of obstetric care have failed to identify any differences in
the quality of care rendered by obstetricians with varying histories of
malpractice claims."'38
A weak correlation between the occurrence of malpractice liability
and the occurrence of malpractice does not make experience rating
infeasible. The weak correlation only makes it harder to solve an oth-
erwise difficult predictive problem. The difficulty stems from the in-
frequency of malpractice claims for individual policyholders.
[T]he degree of autocorrelation in most physicians' claims experi-
ence over time is low. Arguments for experience rating find sup-
port in statistics showing that most physicians have very little
experience of being sued, while a small number of "bad apples" ex-
perience a large number of claims. The distribution of actual losses(payouts to plaintiffs) is even more sharply skewed. However, most
physicians' claim experience fluctuates dramatically from year to
year, so the number of claims (or total losses) from one year, or
even a five-year period, is not a reliable predictor of their claims in
years to come.39
The problem is then exacerbated by the length of time ordinarily re-
quired for resolving malpractice claims. 40 As the New York Depart-
ment of Insurance concluded in its unfavorable assessment of
experience rating: "Due to the length of time claims are open, it is
35. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1362-63 (1992).
36. See White, supra note 34, at 77-81 (summarizing studies that have examined the negli-
gence system in medical malpractice).
37. The data from the HMPS, for example, found that "about thirty to thirty-five of every
1,000 malpractice victims use the legal system to obtain compensation for their losses.... At the
same time, twenty-five to thirty people who were probably not victims of malpractice neverthe-
less receive payment from the system." Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1499, 1501 (1991). See generally Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia
Liability, 261 JAMA 1599 (1989) (empirical study finding that claimants received compensation
in forty-seven percent of cases not involving negligence).
38. Mello & Brennan, supra note 4, at 1607.
39. Id. at 1616-17 (footnotes omitted).
40. One study, for example, found that "[f]ifty percent of claims were closed more than 5.5
years after the date of the medical accident, 25 percent more than 7.5 years later, and 10 percent
more than 10 years later." WEILER ET AL., supra note 11, at 68.
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difficult to have enough meaningful data for merit rating of medical
malpractice."41
Despite these problems, experience rating is feasible. Some studies
have shown that malpractice insurance can be experience rated.
42
Limited forms of experience rating have also been used by private
insurers:
The programs were limited in the following dimensions: First, very
few physician insureds were typically affected. In several cases, less
than 1 percent of physician enrollees paid more than standard rates
because of adverse prior claims experience. Second, the surcharges
were generally not substantial. They ranged from around 10 per-
cent to 200 percent of the base premium. Although 200 percent
may seem a large number, the variation in paid losses per exposure
year within specialties tends to be far greater than this. Surcharges
tended to be imposed on policy-holders for a two- or three-year pe-
riod. Third, rather than affecting premiums through a strict mech-
anistic formula, the physician's track record was often modified by
peer review with an appeals mechanism in the event of an adverse
decision.43
The statistical difficulty of experience rating, therefore, does not ap-
pear to be insurmountable. The source of the problem lies elsewhere.
The efforts by private insurers to adopt limited forms of experience
rating for medical malpractice have been resisted by physicians.44 A
similar outcome has occurred in New York and Massachusetts, each of
which has made a limited form of experience rating mandatory.45 Af-
ter reviewing how this form of rate setting worked, the New York De-
partment of Insurance concluded that "[p]hysicians are unalterably
opposed to merit rating."'46 Massachusetts never adopted its experi-
ence-rating plan due to political opposition.
47
41. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 172 (quoting N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, A BALANCED PRE-
SCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 46 (1988)).
42. See generally Gary M. Fournier & Melayne Morgan McInnes, The Case for Experience
Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Evaluation, 68 J. RISK & INS. 255 (2001);
Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Equity and Accuracy in Medical Malpractice Insurance Pric-
ing, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 289 (1990); see also Gail A. Jensen et al., Physicians and the Risk of
Medical Malpractice: The Role of Prior Litigation in Predicting the Future, 39 Q. REV. ECON. &
FIN. 267 (1999) (finding through theory and empirical study that malpractice liability is signifi-
cantly more likely when the defendant has a prior poor litigation record).
43. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 177 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 178.
45. Darling, supra note 16, at 265-71 (describing the statutory mandates in New York and
Massachusetts).
46. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 172 (quoting N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, A BALANCED PRE-
SCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 46 (1988)).
47. Id. at 173.
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The medical community is concerned about experience rating for
reasons attributable to the inherent uncertainty regarding malpractice
determinations. The paucity of malpractice claims incurred by the
typical policyholder forces insurers to rely upon all relevant data to
establish the individualized premium, including open and closed
claims. The more recent claims typically are open or unresolved-an
outcome attributable to uncertainty4 8-and require evaluation of the
merits by peer review. And even for closed claims resulting in mal-
practice liability, the high rate of legal error requires peer review to
ensure that the liability determinations properly relate to the quality
of care.49 In effect, peer review substitutes for the lengthy, unreliable
legal determination of malpractice. But even though the relevant mal-
practice experience is determined by medical professionals, the medi-
cal community has resisted efforts to base premiums on the
malpractice experience of the policyholder. Apparently, the medical
community believes that peer review does not adequately reduce the
uncertainty regarding malpractice determinations.
This concern about peer review finds support in various empirical
studies seeking to estimate the rate of medical errors among hospital-
ized patients: "These statistics are generally based on peer review us-
ing structured implicit review instruments. Physicians are trained to
review hospital medical records and give their opinion on the occur-
rence of adverse events and the quality of hospital care and its impact
on patient outcomes. ' 50 These studies have yielded similar statistics
regarding the rate of medical error experienced by hospitalized pa-
tients.51 The similar statistics produced by the studies does not mean,
48. Uncertainty most likely increases the length of time required to resolve malpractice
claims. The settlement range for any claim is determined by the minimum price the plaintiff
would accept to settle the claim and the maximum price the defendant would pay. Uncertainty
can cause the two prices to diverge so that there is no settlement range-the plaintiff's minimum
price exceeds the defendant's maximum price-forcing the case to trial. And even if the parties
similarly evaluate the merits of the malpractice claim, uncertainty will increase the settlement
range. A larger settlement range has indeterminate effects on the likelihood of settlement.
"Perhaps the best guess is that the larger the settlement range the likelier a settlement is, but the
longer the negotiation of the settlement is likely to take. With more at stake, the optimal
amount of negotiation is greater." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.4,
at 567 (6th ed. 2003).
49. Cf. Randall P. Ellis et al., Should Medical Professional Liability Insurance Be Experience
Rated?, 57 J. RISK & INS. 66 (1990) (showing that experience rating based only on the number of
claims filed or paid would create a significant risk of inappropriate surcharges due to the large
number of invalid claims).
50. Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical
Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415, 415 (2001).
51. Id.
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though, that peer review reliably identifies particular instances of
malpractice.
In all general medical and surgical chart review studies to date, re-
viewers have had a difficult time agreeing on whether an error
caused by an adverse event or even on whether something was an
error at all. Reviewer agreement is usually even worse when spe-
cific processes of care are evaluated (as opposed to overall care)
and attempts at improving the true reliability of implicit review by
discussion between reviewers have been unsuccessful.
52
In one study, for example, "[i]f one reviewer rated a death as defi-
nitely or probably preventable, the probability that the next reviewer
would rate the case as definitely not preventable (18%) was actually
slightly higher than the probability that the second reviewer would
agree with the first (16%)." 5 3
These studies portray a troubling situation in which almost all ac-
tive-care injuries could plausibly lead to a tort suit with evidence suffi-
cient to go to the jury. As long as the plaintiff continues to search for
an expert opinion supporting the malpractice claim, the diversity of
medical opinions on malpractice makes it likely that there will be at
least one medical reviewer who believes that the injury was caused by
medical error.54 While the expert opinion may be an outlier, it is also
presumably based on medical expertise and therefore is ordinarily suf-
ficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof. And when experts
frequently disagree about the merits of a malpractice claim, medical
professionals are understandably skeptical of most legal findings of
malpractice.
The reliability of malpractice determinations thus poses the real ob-
stacle to experience rating and the attainment of fairer, individualized
malpractice premiums. A policyholder's premiums should be based
on her claims experience only if that experience is a good indicator of
the individual's ability to provide high-quality care. The imposition of
malpractice liability on the policyholder is, however, not a reliable in-
dicator nor is an independent finding by peer review. The uncertainty
undermines the ability of insurance companies to establish individual-
ized premiums on a fair basis, which exemplifies the more general
problem that uncertainty poses for well-functioning insurance mar-
52. Id. at 419-20 (footnotes omitted); see also Eric J. Thomas et al., The Reliability of Medical
Record Review for Estimating Adverse Event Rates, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 812, 814 (2002)
(study finding "moderate to poor inter-rater reliability among physicians trying to identify ad-
verse events and negligent adverse events by medical record review").
53. See Hayward & Hofer, supra note 50, at 417.
54. See id. at 418 (concluding that "given enough reviewers, almost all active-care deaths
would have some reviewers who believe that an error caused the death").
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kets. 55 As long as malpractice determinations are subject to uncer-
tainty and differing interpretations, malpractice insurers will have
difficulty experience rating premiums. 56
This obstacle to fairer malpractice premiums implicates tort reform,
as the problem stems from the malpractice determination that triggers
tort liability. What, then, are the types of reforms that would make
malpractice premiums fairer? Further, how do these reforms compare
to those advocated by the AMA?
V. FAIRER MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS VIA TORT REFORM
The medical profession's interest in fair malpractice premiums can
help justify tort reforms that facilitate experience rating by reducing
the uncertainty associated with malpractice determinations. The unre-
liability of peer-review findings, however, might mean that uncer-
tainty is inherent in any legal regime that ties liability to malpractice.
For example, efforts to improve the reliability of medical record re-
view have been unsuccessful.5 7 Similarly, studies have found that
medical review panels do little to improve the accuracy of legal deter-
minations of malpractice liability.58
Assuming there is no tort reform capable of significantly improving
upon the reliability of malpractice determinations, the damages cap
proposed by the AMA has superficial appeal. A damages cap effec-
tively reduces the potential scope of tort liability and therefore the
amount of uncertainty created by the tort system. With respect to
compensatory damages, the component attributable to pain and suf-
55. See Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Lia-
bility Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 839-42 (1994). This article provides various reasons why
"[i]ncreased legal uncertainty.., translates into higher costs for insurance companies even if the
mean value of the loss stays constant." Id. at 841. For more recent studies showing how uncer-
tainty undermines insurance markets, see J. David Cummins & Christopher M. Lewis, Cata-
strophic Events, Parameter Uncertainty and the Breakdown of Implicit Long-Term Contracting:
The Case of Terrorism Insurance, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 153 (2003) Kenneth A. Froot &
Paul G.J. O'Connell, The Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance, in THE FINANCING OF CATAS-
TROPHE RISK 195 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999) (providing and testing model in which the equi-
librium price of insurance increases with increased volatility of the policyholder's loss
distribution due to the insurer's increased need to raise costly, external capital).
56. See Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 1339, 1361 (Anthony J. Cuyler & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (concluding that
"if judicial error is significant, risk aversion would explain the lack of demand for experience-
rated policies").
57. See Timothy P. Hofer et al., Discussion Between Reviewers Does Not Improve Reliability
of Peer Review of Hospital Quality, 38 MED. CARE 152 (2000).
58. See Patricia M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 373-74 (1983); Stephen Shmanske & Tina
Stevens, The Performance of Medical Malpractice Review Panels, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
LAW 525 (1986).
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fering creates the most uncertainty.5 9 Hence, a cap on nonmonetary
damages can be justified as a means of reducing uncertainty, although
other reforms like improved jury instructions or scheduling are a more
effective means of achieving this result.
60
Whatever the merits of a damages cap may otherwise be, the reform
cannot be supported by the legitimate interests of the medical profes-
sion. A damages cap would reduce uncertainty without facilitating ex-
perience-rated malpractice premiums. The reform would not improve
the quality of data required for experience rating; malpractice deter-
minations would continue to be as unreliable as they were prior to
reform. Instead, a damages cap would reduce the extent of liability
and the general level of malpractice premiums. The general level of
malpractice premiums, though, is not unfairly high for the medical
profession. 61 A damages cap would not make malpractice premiums
fairer for physicians.
Other tort reforms, by contrast, would make malpractice premiums
fairer. Consider enterprise liability, which would replace the current
malpractice system with a legal regime holding medical enterprises
(hospitals or managed care organizations) strictly liable for the avoid-
able medical injuries incurred by their patients. 62 The medical enter-
prise, rather than the medical professional performing the service in
question, would be responsible to the patient for all avoidable medical
injuries, thereby eliminating the legal uncertainty and other problems
created by individualized malpractice determinations. Freed from in-
dividual liability, physicians and other medical professionals would no
longer need to purchase malpractice insurance. Instead, the medical
enterprise would pay the collective cost of malpractice insurance for
all of its medical professionals, yielding a sufficiently extensive claims
experience to make feasible the experience rating of malpractice pre-
59. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 775, 783-89 (1995) (summa-
rizing studies finding a high variability in pain and suffering awards and describing problems
created by this uncertainty).
60. See id. at 803-18, 828-40 (describing how jury instructions can be improved and how
scheduling could be defensibly implemented).
61. See discussion supra Part 11.
62. See generally Abraham & Weiler, supra note 31. A more limited version of enterprise
liability would make the enterprise jointly liable with the physician. See Mello & Brennan, supra
note 4, at 1624-29. The limited version of enterprise liability would effectively require medical
professionals to purchase individual malpractice insurance. Unless the shift to avoidability-
based liability determinations makes experience rating more feasible, this reform would not pro-
duce fairer malpractice premiums for physicians.
4592005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
miums. 63 The unfair malpractice premiums for individual physicians
would be replaced by the more fairly determined malpractice premi-
ums for medical enterprises.
As clearly revealed by a comparison of a damages cap with enter-
prise liability, different tort reforms have different impacts on the fair-
ness of malpractice premiums. Nevertheless, this differential impact
has not influenced the reforms preferred by the medical profession.
For purposes of promoting more fair malpractice premiums, tort re-
form must reduce the uncertainty regarding malpractice determina-
tions. The uncertainty could be eliminated by two different reforms:
eliminating the requirement that liability depends upon malpractice
(enterprise liability), or eliminating all malpractice liability (a cap on
all damages). The medical profession is not indifferent between these
two reforms. Unlike enterprise liability, a damages cap benefits all
medical professionals, explaining why the AMA has lobbied against
enterprise liability in favor of a damages cap within the current mal-
practice regime.64 Such lobbying cannot be justified in terms of the
medical profession's legitimate interests in tort reform, given that en-
terprise liability would eliminate the current unfairness faced by medi-
cal professionals, whereas a damages cap would not. The reforms that
have been favored so far by the AMA do not reliably correspond to
those reforms that would make malpractice premiums fairer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Malpractice insurance is an understandable source of frustration for
medical professionals. Those who pay the highest premiums feel the
most frustration, and these physicians are the ones who are treated
unfairly. And since malpractice premiums are required only because
of malpractice liability, the medical profession's frustration with mal-
practice premiums is understandably directed at the tort system.
The unfairness for medical professionals, however, stems from the
manner in which malpractice premiums are priced. Premiums priced
solely on the basis of specialty and geographic location may be detri-
mental to medical patients, on balance, due to the movement of some
physicians out of high-risk specialties and geographic areas. In that
event, the existing premium structure produces unfair malpractice
premiums for those medical professionals, like obstetricians, who pay
63. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 31, at 410-11; Mello & Brennan, supra note 4, at 1598,
1617-18.
64. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 31, at 383 (describing the AMA's lobbying efforts in
the early 1990s opposing the Clinton Administration's tentative proposal to adopt medical enter-
prise liability).
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the highest premiums. These physicians are effectively penalized for
making socially valuable choices regarding specialty or geographic
location.
But because the ire of the medical profession has been understand-
ably directed at the tort system, "the liability insurance system itself
has been spared serious analysis from a health policy perspective.
65
Unless that perspective is adopted, most medical professionals will
probably find the existing structure of malpractice premiums to be
fairer than one of uniform premiums across specialties and locations.
After all, obstetricians incur much more malpractice liability than
other specialists, so it somehow seems right that obstetricians should
pay higher premiums as a result of their choice to practice in such a
high-risk specialty. This view is seemingly correct only because it fails
to consider malpractice insurance from a health policy perspective.
Once the health consequences of the existing premium structure are
taken into account, the problem with the liability insurance system
becomes apparent. Premiums individualized by specialty and geo-
graphic location are quite plausibly detrimental to patient interests.
This possibility, easily missed when one's ire is directed at the tort
system, obviously follows from the fact that the vast majority of health
care consumers prefer insurance and its collectivization of health care
risks as compared to individualized risk-bearing, all else being equal.
Of course, not all else needs to be equal. Individualized risk-bear-
ing can have desirable incentive effects. Individualized malpractice
premiums based on specialty, geographic location, and claims experi-
ence could create individual incentives that reduce the incidence of
medical error and better protect patient interests. Such a system of
individualized malpractice premiums may be more desirable than one
of uniform premiums. The experience rating of malpractice premi-
ums, unfortunately, is difficult. The occurrence of malpractice liability
is not a reliable indicator of malpractice occurrence.
It is only at this point that tort reform should become a relevant
consideration in evaluating malpractice insurance. Reforms that
would improve upon the reliability of malpractice determinations can
facilitate experience rating, which would then make the malpractice
premium fairly dependant upon the physician's other individual risk
characteristics, such as specialty and geographic location. By contrast,
the tort reform currently favored by the AMA-a damages cap for
pain and suffering-would not make malpractice premiums fairer.
65. Sage, supra note 20, at 10 (footnotes omitted).
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The AMA, however, need not abandon the reform. A damages cap
could be defensibly implemented within a system of enterprise liabil-
ity. When medical enterprises are liable for avoidable injuries, mal-
practice risk is collectivized and individualized incentives for
physicians can be maintained by the organization, resulting in a distri-
bution of malpractice costs among physicians that is fairer than the
distribution presently produced by malpractice premiums. Enterprise
liability coupled with a cap on non-economic damages would be simi-
lar to workers' compensation, which is a no-fault liability regime de-
signed to compensate workers only for monetary injuries. 66 The
similarity with workers' compensation does not have to end there.
The adoption of workers' compensation schemes in the early twenti-
eth century showed workers that the managerial or scientific control
of the workplace did not entail a lack of concern for worker safety.67
So too, by lobbying for the adoption of medical enterprise liability
coupled with a damages cap, the medical profession would show pa-
tients that the cost concerns now driving the industry need not be det-
rimental to patient safety.
66. For a description of the workers' compensation system, see 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: REPORTERS' STUDY 105-27 (1991). Even
though workers' compensation is supposed to compensate only for financial harms, the sched-
uled benefits for permanent partial disabilities provide awards regardless of whether the disabil-
ity impairs the victim's wage-earning capacity. Id. at 114. "Certainly, though, no [workers'
compensation] program awards damages like those regularly paid in tort litigation for the purely
non-financial consequences of personal injuries." Id.
67. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTI-
TUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 103-51 (2004).
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